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Watergate, Multiple Conspiracies, and the 
White House Tapes 
Arnold Rochvarg* 
On January 1, 1975, John Mitchell, former United States Attorney 
General, John Ehrlichman, former Chief White House Assistant for 
Domestic Affairs, H.R. Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff, and 
Robert Mardian, former Assistant Attorney General, were convicted of 
conspiracy1 for their involvement in what is generally known as 
“Watergate.”2  The Watergate conspiracy trial, presided over by Judge John 
Sirica, had run from October 1, 1974 until December 27, 1974.3  The trial 
included the in-court testimony of most of the figures involved in the 
Watergate scandal,4 and the playing of thirty of the “White House tapes.”5  
The purpose of this Symposium article is to discuss whether the evidence 
presented at the Watergate trial is better understood as evidence of multiple 
conspiracies, as argued by two of the defendants,6 or as a single conspiracy 
as argued by the prosecution.  The article first will set forth the law on 
multiple conspiracies and apply that law to the evidence presented at the 
Watergate conspiracy trial.  The article will then discuss whether the 
admission into evidence of certain White House tapes premised on the 
single conspiracy view may have prejudiced any of the convicted 
defendants. 
I.  THE LAW OF MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES 
It is not uncommon at a criminal conspiracy trial, or on appeal from a 
conviction of conspiracy, for a defendant to argue that a guilty verdict for 
 
 * Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.  Professor Rochvarg was a member of the 
legal defense team that represented Robert Mardian in the appeal of his conviction of conspiracy at the 
Watergate  conspiracy   trial.     Mardian’s  conviction was reversed.  United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 
973 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
 2 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., 
Ehrlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).  Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman were also 
convicted of various substantive offenses such as obstruction of justice, perjury, and false declarations 
before a grand jury or court. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54. 
 3 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 130 n.284. 
 4 Id. at 51. The most notable exceptions were former President Nixon and Gordon Liddy, neither 
of whom testified. Id. 
 5 Id. at 108. 
 6 Both Mitchell, Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 91–92, and Mardian, Mardian, 546 F.2d at 975, raised 
multiple conspiracy arguments on appeal. 
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the conspiracy charged in the indictment is inappropriate because the 
evidence at trial established that there were several separate conspiracies.7  
Criminal indictments typically charge a group of defendants with being 
conspirators in a single conspiracy.8  From the prosecution’s perspective, a 
single conspiracy charge is advantageous because it permits acts and 
statements of any of the defendants to be used against the other defendants.  
Defendants usually argue for multiple conspiracies to avoid having the acts 
and statements of others being admitted against them, as well as to demand 
severance to obtain a separate trial.9  This section of the article will discuss 
the various approaches courts have taken when deciding whether evidence 
establishes a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies. 
A. Chain or Hub and Spoke Conspiracies 
Some courts, when discussing the multiple conspiracy issue, focus on 
whether the conspiracy is a “chain” or a “hub and spoke” conspiracy.10  A 
chain conspiracy is treated as a single conspiracy, while a hub and spoke 
conspiracy is treated as proof of multiple conspiracies.11 
The classic case involving hub and spoke conspiracies is Kotteakos v. 
United States,12 a 1946 opinion from the United States Supreme Court.  
The criminal scheme in Kotteakos involved the procurement of fraudulent 
loans to defraud the Federal Housing Administration.13  Simon Brown was 
the “common and key” figure in all of the fraudulent loans.14  Brown 
agreed with thirty-six persons to fraudulently procure loans for a five 
percent commission.15  The multiple conspiracy issue presented was 
whether the various persons for whom Brown procured loans were all 
conspirators in one conspiracy along with Brown.16  The Court viewed the 
defendants other than Brown as spokes emanating from the center hub 
(Brown) who were all independent of each other.17  The proof at trial 
“made out a case, not of a single conspiracy, but of several, 
notwithstanding, only one was charged in the indictment.”18 
The hub and spoke analogy has been discussed by many courts in 
conspiracy prosecutions involving several criminal schemes.19  It is a 
 
 7  Herbert Wechsler, et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Modern Penal Code of the 
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 980 (1961). 
 8 United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1389–90 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 9 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 10 United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 11 United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 842 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 936 (2008). 
 12 Kotteakos, at 754–55. 
 13 Id. at 752. 
 14 Id. at 753. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 758. 
 17 Id. at 754–55. 
 18 Id. at 755. 
 19 See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 327 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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popular argument in wide-ranging drug conspiracies,20 as well as in 
conspiracy cases involving a small number of defendants in non-drug 
cases.21  For example, a hub and spoke conspiracy was found in United 
States v. McDermott,22 which involved an investment banker who was 
having an affair with an adult film star.  As part of his affair, McDermott 
passed on insider financial information to his paramour.23  Unknown to 
McDermott, the film actress was having an affair with another man, and 
during that affair, she passed on the insider information to him.24  Together 
they made profits of over $170,000 in stock trades.25  The Second Circuit 
reversed McDermott’s conviction of a single conspiracy involving all three 
persons.26  In this case, the adult film actress was the hub and the two men 
were the spokes with no conspiratorial relationship. 
To be contrasted with hub and spoke conspiracies is the single chain 
conspiracy.  In the single chain conspiracy, each defendant is viewed as 
linked to every other defendant despite the lack of direct communication or 
contact with each other.27  Most chain conspiracy cases involve the 
production, distribution, and sale of illegal drugs.28  For example, United 
States v. Bruno29 held that smugglers, middlemen, and sellers of narcotics 
were all members of one conspiracy under the chain conspiracy approach, 
despite the lack of evidence of any cooperation or communication between 
the smugglers and any sellers or between the different sellers in different 
states.30 
B. The Agreement 
Some courts, when discussing the multiple conspiracy issue, focus on 
the agreement among the defendants.31  The classic case here is Braverman 
v. United States,32 which involved a conspiracy to violate federal tax 
laws.33  The United States Supreme Court held that the “precise nature and 
 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 936 (2008); 
United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1223 
(2008); United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 22 United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133 (2d. Cir. 2001). 
 23 Id. at 138. 
 24 Id. at 136. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 142. 
 27 United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 28 Id. 
 29 United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev’d  on  other  grounds, 308 U.S. 287 
(1939). 
 30 Id. at 922. 
 31 See, e.g., United States v. Trainor, 477 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007); United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 6.18.371H (2010). 
 32 Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). 
 33 Id. at 50. 
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extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement 
which embraces and defines its objects.”34 
It is possible for various persons to be parties to a single agreement, 
and thus co-conspirators in a single conspiracy, even though they do not 
know the identity of the other members of the conspiracy or are unaware of 
the acts of the others.35  Nor does a single conspiracy become multiple 
conspiracies because members drop out or are added.36  A defendant can be 
part of a single conspiracy even if that defendant played only a small part 
during a short time period of that conspiracy.37  Additionally, just because 
there are different subgroups operating in different places, it does not mean 
that there is more than one conspiracy.38  In all of these circumstances, as 
long as there is a single agreement to which all defendants agreed, there is 
one conspiracy of which all defendants are guilty.39 
C. Common Goal or Purpose 
Another approach to the multiple conspiracy issue focuses on whether 
the defendants charged with conspiracy had a common goal or purpose.  In 
Blumenthal v. United States,40 the Supreme Court found a single conspiracy 
to acquire and sell whiskey at higher-than-authorized prices even though 
there were several agreements because all the defendants “sought a 
common end.”41  The multiple agreements were viewed not as proving 
different conspiracies, but rather as “essential and integral steps” towards a 
common goal.42  Courts typically define the “common goal” element of a 
single conspiracy broadly.  For example, in United States v. Moore,43 
several correctional officers were found guilty of a single conspiracy for 
engaging in sexual relations with female inmates.44  The defendants argued 
that a single conspiracy did not exist because there were separate 
agreements among different defendants to engage in sex with different 
inmates.45  The Eleventh Circuit rejected this multiple conspiracy 
argument, holding that the officers “had the common goal of trading sex 
with inmates for contraband.”46  Elaborate drug conspiracy convictions 
have been viewed as a single conspiracy despite the possible existence of 
separate agreements.  Courts have found a single conspiracy based on 
 
 34 Id. at 53.  
 35 See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 305 S.E.2d 82, 90 (Ga. 1983). 
 36 United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 699 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 917 (1999). 
 37 United States v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 38 United States v. DiPasquale, 561 F. Supp. 1338, 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947). 
 41 Id. at 559. 
 42 Id. 
 43 United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 44 Id. at 1038–39. 
 45 Id. at 1041–42. 
 46 Id. at 1043. 
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common goals of selling speed,47 trafficking cocaine,48 stealing money 
from a union,49 and defrauding the federal government.50  
When discussing the common purpose aspect of single or multiple 
conspiracies, courts also consider whether the conspiracies were acting at 
cross-purposes with each other.51  For example, in United States v. 
Camiel,52 multiple conspiracies were found, contrary to the single 
conspiracy charged in the indictment, when the alleged single conspiracy 
consisted of two antagonistic factions.53 
II.  WATERGATE TRIAL EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENT CONSPIRACIES 
The evidence presented during the Watergate conspiracy trial could be 
viewed as supporting four different conspiracies: (1) the Ellsberg Break-In 
Conspiracy; (2) the Watergate Break-In Conspiracy; (3) the Cover-Up 
Conspiracy; and (4) the White House Conspiracy. 
A. The Ellsberg Break-In Conspiracy 
Daniel Ellsberg was a military analyst who worked at the RAND 
Corporation after serving at the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara.54  Because of his high-level security clearance, Ellsberg 
gained access to a group of highly classified documents regarding the 
Vietnam War, which became known as the “Pentagon Papers.”55  These 
documents demonstrated that the American public and Congress had been 
deceived about many aspects of the Vietnam War.56  Ellsberg secretly made 
copies of these documents and provided them to The New York Times 
which, in June, 1971, published excerpts and commentary.57  Ellsberg also 
provided copies to The Washington Post and other newspapers.58 
The Nixon administration was very concerned about the publication of 
these Vietnam War documents.59  Attorney General Mitchell ordered The 
 
 47 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1006 
(1990). 
 48 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 1120 (2009); United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695–99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 917 
(1999). 
 49 United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1362–63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1020 
(2008). 
 50 United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 51 Kelly, 892 F.2d at 260. 
 52 United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 53 Id. at 36. 
 54 F.B.I. Continues Investigation of How Times Got Documents, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1971, at 15 
[hereinafter F.B.I. Investigation]. 
 55 The Covert War, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 38. 
 56 Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. 
Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 1. 
 57 Id.; F.B.I. Investigation, supra note 54, at 15. 
 58 Chalmers M. Roberts, Documents   Reveal  U.S.   Effort   in   ’54   to  Delay   Viet   Election, WASH. 
POST, June 18, 1971, at A1. 
 59 Max Frankel, Court Step Likely, Return of Documents Asked in Telegram to Publisher, N.Y. 
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New York Times to cease publication of the leaked information.60  When 
the newspaper refused, the government sued to restrain publication.61  Most 
significant to Watergate, in response to the Ellsberg leaks, a group known 
as the “Plumbers” was organized inside the White House under the 
supervision of John Ehrlichman to deal with national security leaks.62 
One of the projects of the Plumbers was to discredit Daniel Ellsberg.63  
A plan was devised to break into the offices of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. 
Lewis Fielding, to obtain medical records on Ellsberg which the White 
House hoped would destroy Ellsberg’s credibility.64  Ehrlichman approved 
this covert operation after receiving assurances that it could not be traced 
back to the White House.65  On September 3, 1971, a group including 
Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt, and Bernard Barker burglarized Dr. 
Fielding’s medical office—nothing on Ellsberg was found.66 
The public did not learn of the Plumber’s’ break-in until April of 1973 
when, during the criminal trial of Ellsberg for violating the Espionage Act 
of 1917, information about the Plumbers’ burglary was revealed.67  This 
revelation, along with revelations that the government had engaged in 
illegal wiretapping of Ellsberg, and that the presiding judge, William 
Matthew Bryne, Jr., had been offered the directorship of the FBI by John 
Ehrlichman, led to the dismissal of all charges against Ellsberg.68 
More than three full days at the Watergate conspiracy trial were 
devoted to evidence involving the White House Plumbers’ break-in of 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.69  Although this evidence was most relevant 
to John Ehrlichman, the prosecution’s position at the Watergate trial was 
that it was “admissible against all [defendants] even though only 
Ehrlichman had been personally involved in the actual authorization.”70  
The prosecution argued that the burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office 
established a motive for the Watergate conspiracy charged in the 
indictment.71  Some of the same persons who participated in the Ellsberg 
 
TIMES, June 15, 1971, at 1. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Fred P. Graham, Argument Friday, Court Here Refuses to Order Return of Documents Now, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1971, at 1; Texts of Government Papers in Complaint Against the Times and 
Judge’s  Order, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1971, at 18. 
 62 Earl Krogh, The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A17. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Text of Ruling by Judge in Ellsberg Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1973, at 14.  
 65 The Plumbers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22, 1973, at 197. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Martin Arnold, Ellsberg Lawyers Weigh New Motion for Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1973, at 1. 
 68 See Guilty: The Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1973, at 32. 
 69 Brief for Robert C. Mardian at 4 [hereinafter MARDIAN’S BRIEF], United States v. Mardian, 
546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 70 Brief for the United States at 256 n.342 [hereinafter GOV’T BRIEF], United States v. Haldeman, 
559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (No. 75-1381). 
 71 See Seymour M. Hersh, Prosecutors Feel Motive in Cover-Up Was Wish to Hide Ellsberg 
Burglary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1974, at 41. 
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psychiatrist break-in had also participated in the Watergate break-in, most 
prominently Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt.72  Moreover, the Ellsberg 
break-in conspiracy evidence explained Hunt’s threats after his Watergate 
burglary arrest and conviction to expose the “seamy things” he had done 
for the White House if his money demands were not met.73 
B. The Watergate Break-In Conspiracy 
The Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP) was organized to run 
Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign.74  It was understood that John 
Mitchell would leave the post of Attorney General to become the head of 
CRP, but until that time, the nominal head of CRP was Jeb Magruder.75  In 
November of 1971, Mitchell, still Attorney General, along with John Dean, 
who was Counsel to the President, interviewed Gordon Liddy for a position 
at CRP.76  Liddy had been recommended to Dean by Egil Krogh,77 who 
was in charge of the “Plumbers” and supervised by Ehrlichman.78  During 
the interview, there was discussion of CRP’s intelligence needs.79  After 
being hired, Liddy, along with Howard Hunt, began developing a political 
espionage plan.80  At a meeting in January of 1972, Liddy presented to 
Mitchell, Dean and Magruder a plan he called “Gemstone.”81  This 
$1,000,000 plan included burglaries, electronic surveillance, kidnapping, 
and prostitutes.82  Mitchell rejected the plan as not “quite what [he] had in 
mind.”83  About one week later, Mitchell, Magruder, Dean and Liddy met 
again in Mitchell’s office.84  The new plan’s budget was now $500,000.85  
The revised plan still included burglaries and wiretaps.86  Mitchell refused 
to give approval to this scaled-down plan on the basis that it was still too 
costly.87  Dean commented at this meeting that the Attorney General’s 
office was not the place that such plans should be discussed, and suggested 
that Magruder be Liddy’s point person to provide cover for Mitchell.88 
 
 72 See Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Break-In Memo Sent to Ehrlichman, WASH. POST, June 
13, 1973, at A1. 
 73 See Transcript of Nixon Talks of March 21, 1973, WASH. POST, May 1, 1974, at A20; Walter 
Pincus, Hearing Howard Hunt, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1973, at C6. 
 74 THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 153 (1975). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 11; Transcript of Record at 2627, 7675, United States v. John N. 
Mitchell, et al., Criminal No. 74-110 (D.D.C 1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
 77 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 11 n.8; Transcript at 7654–56. 
 78 Id. at 11 n.8. 
 79 Id. at 12; Transcript at 4117–20. 
 80 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 12. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; Transcript at 2628–31. 
 84 Gov’t  Brief, supra note 70, at 12. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.; Transcript at 2632–34. 
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Dean reported what occurred at this meeting to Haldeman.89  Both 
Dean and Haldeman agreed that the White House should not be involved 
with CRP’s illegal intelligence plans.90  However, Gordon Strachan, who 
was Haldeman’s assistant, was kept informed by Magruder of Liddy’s 
plans.91  When Mitchell, on March 30, 1972, approved a budget of 
$250,000 for Liddy, Magruder informed Strachan of Mitchell’s approval.92  
Thereafter, Liddy began receiving money from CRP to implement his 
plan.93 
On Memorial Day weekend, a team of burglars directed by Liddy and 
Hunt broke into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters 
in the Watergate office complex.94  The burglars photographed some 
documents and installed wiretaps on telephones.95  A couple of weeks later, 
Magruder showed Mitchell some of the photographs and information from 
the wiretaps.96  Mitchell expressed dissatisfaction, and Magruder conveyed 
Mitchell’s reaction to Liddy.97  Liddy explained to Magruder that the 
listening devices were not working properly, but that this would be fixed.98  
Liddy and Hunt then organized a second break-in of the DNC offices.99  
This second break-in occurred on June 17, 1972.
100
  This break-in led to the 
arrest of not only Hunt and Liddy, but also James McCord, who was 
employed as security director at CRP, as well as other men, including 
Eugenio Martinez and Bernard Barker, who had participated in the break-in 
of Dr. Fielding’s office.101  Hunt, Barker and three of the burglars pled 
guilty to the burglary of the DNC offices.102  McCord and Liddy pled not 
guilty, but were convicted at trial.103  Neither testified.104  Shortly before 
the sentencing of all of those guilty in the DNC Watergate office burglary, 
McCord sent a letter to Judge Sirica stating that there had been pressure 
exerted upon him and the others to remain silent.105 
The prosecution presented the evidence of the planning and execution 
of the burglaries at the DNC offices at Watergate to establish motive for the 
conspiracy charged in Count I of the Indictment against Mitchell, 
 
 89 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53. 
 90 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 12; Transcript at 2635–36. 
 91 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53. 
 92 Id. at 52. 
 93 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13; Transcript at 3276–77. 
 94 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13; Transcript at 4139–44. 
 95 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 13. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 13–14. 
 98 Id. at 14. 
 99 Id. 
 100 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 101 Id. at 52 n.9. The other two men arrested inside the DNC offices were Frank Sturgis and 
Virgilio Gonzales. Id. 
 102 CONG. QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 10 (Wayne Kelley ed., 1975). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Gov’t  Brief,  supra note 70, at 32. 
 105 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 10. 
Do Not Delete 8/1/2012 8:26 PM 
2012] Watergate, Multiple Conspiracies 50 
Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Mardian.  Although it appears it would have 
been possible for Mitchell and perhaps Haldeman to have been charged 
with conspiracy to burglarize the DNC offices, none of the defendants at 
the Watergate conspiracy trial were charged with conspiracy relating to the 
actual break-ins of the DNC offices in May and June of 1972. 
C. The Cover-Up Conspiracy 
Once it became known that McCord had been arrested along with 
others at the DNC offices at Watergate, various acts were committed in 
order to cover up the fact that CRP and White House officials had planned 
and organized the break-in.106  The prosecution’s evidence covered a wide 
range of conspiratorial acts.107 
Shortly after learning of McCord’s arrest, Mitchell, Mardian, 
Magruder and Fred LaRue, another CRP official, arranged for Liddy to 
seek Attorney General Richard Kleindienst’s aid in getting McCord 
released from jail.108  Mitchell, Mardian, Magruder and LaRue also 
participated in the issuance of a press release, approved by Haldeman, that 
denied that McCord’s involvement with the DNC break-in was related to 
his employment at CRP.109 
In order to further disassociate any connection with those arrested at 
the DNC offices at Watergate with CRP or the White House, Magruder 
destroyed all papers relating to Liddy’s Gemstone plan.110  The prosecution 
introduced evidence that implicated Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, Dean, and 
Strachan in this.  Strachan also reported to Dean and Haldeman that he had 
destroyed DNC wiretap reports and Watergate-related memos that he had 
kept in his files.  Additionally, Dean met with Ehrlichman and Charles 
Colson, Special Counsel to the President, and they discussed having Hunt 
leave the country.111  When Colson disclosed that Hunt had a safe in the 
Executive Office Building that might contain embarrassing information, 
Ehrlichman instructed Dean to have the safe opened and have its contents 
removed.112 
Evidence was presented about attempts to thwart the FBI investigation 
into the Watergate break-in.113  Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mardian 
were implicated in trying to get the CIA to take responsibility for the break-
in.114  They also tracked the FBI investigation into the DNC burglary to 
 
 106 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 107 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 9. 
 108 United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 53–54. 
 111 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 112. 
 112 Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54. 
 113 CONG. QUARTERLY, supra note 102, at 820. 
 114 See id. at 66. 
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determine if the FBI had any information tying the burglary to CRP or the 
White House.115 
Once it became clear that Liddy would be identified as the leader of 
the burglary team, the conspirators developed various cover stories to 
explain why approximately $199,000 in CRP funds had been given to 
him.116  Such cover stories included that the money had been earmarked for 
security at the upcoming Republican convention and for security for 
surrogate speakers.117  Magruder rehearsed with Dean and Mitchell the 
false cover story he intended to give to the grand jury investigating the 
Watergate burglary.118  False information was also given to the FBI and the 
grand jury by Mitchell and Ehrlichman.119 
The cover-up also included the payment of hush money to those guilty 
of the Watergate burglary.120  The persons involved with the hush money 
payments included Herbert Kalmbach and Anthony Ulasewicz.121  As well 
as payments of cash to the burglars, there were suggestions from the White 
House of presidential clemency for the burglars.122 
The efforts to keep the burglars quiet and not implicate anyone at CRP 
or the White House appeared to be successful.  Nixon had won a landslide 
re-election in November 1972.123  During the early winter of 1973, Hunt 
had pleaded guilty, as had four of the burglars.124  Although McCord and 
Liddy pleaded not guilty and went to trial, neither testified.125  None of 
those involved in the burglary tied it to CRP or the White House.126  But 
inside the White House, Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean were 
especially concerned about Hunt.127  Hunt’s demands for money continued 
after his guilty plea.128  Things changed, however, on March 19, 1973, the 
day of sentencing for those guilty of the Watergate break-in, when McCord 
wrote a letter to Judge Sirica revealing that the burglars had been forced to 
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remain silent, that perjury had been committed, and that others were 
involved in the break-in.129 
D. The White House Conspiracy 
McCord’s letter led to significant developments.  Within a month of 
the letter, Dean began cooperating with the prosecutors.130  Shortly 
thereafter, Magruder and LaRue met with the prosecutors.131  Most of the 
evidence presented at the Watergate conspiracy trial covering events after 
McCord’s March 1973 letter focused on how Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and 
Nixon sought to justify their actions in the pre-McCord letter period.132  
Much of this evidence was presented through the White House tapes.133  
Nixon told Ehrlichman that everyone should “have a straight damn 
line[:] . . . we raised money for a purpose that we thought was perfectly 
proper.”134  There were discussions in the White House to have Dean, 
Mitchell and Magruder take all the blame in return for clemency.135  It was 
thought at one point by those within the White House that no investigation 
was likely of what happened after June 17, 1972 (the date of the break-in) 
if Mitchell would step forward and admit his guilt for what happened 
before June 17.136  Mitchell, however, was unwilling to take the blame.137 
Dean was also seen as a possible scapegoat.  On one White House 
tape, Nixon told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that Dean should be told to 
“look down the road . . . that there’s only one man that could restore him to 
the ability to practice law.”138  After Dean refused Ehrlichman’s invitation 
to meet, Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman discussed a plan where the 
“scenario” would be that when Dean failed to write a report on Watergate 
as requested by Nixon, Nixon became suspicious and assigned Ehrlichman 
to conduct an investigation, and Ehrlichman’s investigation revealed that 
Dean was the main culprit.139  On the White House tapes, there was 
discussion of the need “to put the wagons up around the President.”140  
False testimony by Haldeman and Ehrlichman was part of this conspiracy.  
Haldeman testified falsely before the Senate Select Committee about 
Nixon’s response to raising $1,000,000 for the burglars—Haldeman 
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Between the President, H.R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman in the Oval Office, (April 16, 1973, at 
10:50 to 11:04 A.M.) (available online at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/ 
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testified that Nixon stated “it would be wrong”—and Ehrlichman testified 
falsely before the grand jury about his knowledge of the payment of hush 
money.141 
E. The Conspiracy in the Indictment 
Count One of the Indictment charged all defendants with conspiracy 
to obstruct justice, make false statements to a government agency, commit 
perjury, make false declarations, and defraud the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of 
Justice, in connection with the federal investigation of the Watergate break-
in and related matters in connection with the trial of the Watergate 
burglars.142  In paragraph eleven of the Indictment, the purpose of the 
conspiracy was stated as “concealing and causing to be concealed the 
identities of the persons who were responsible for, participated in, and had 
knowledge of (a) the activities which were the subject of the investigation 
and trial [of the Watergate burglaries], and (b) other illegal and improper 
activities.”143  The “investigation” set forth in paragraph eleven was 
described in paragraph three as the investigation that began “on or about 
June 17, 1972” to determine whether crimes “had been committed” and to 
“identify” those who “had committed, caused the commission of, and 
conspired to commit such violations.”144  Additionally, paragraph one of 
the Indictment described the arrest of the Watergate burglars on June 17, 
1972, and paragraph four referenced the indictment of the Watergate 
burglars.145 
The Indictment in paragraph sixteen listed forty-five overt acts in 
chronological order, beginning with Mitchell’s request to Mardian on June 
17, 1972 to tell Liddy to seek the help of Attorney General Kleindienst in 
obtaining the release of one or more of the burglars arrested at the DNC 
offices at Watergate, and ending with Ehrlichman telling Egil Krogh on 
March 22, 1973 that Ehrlichman did not believe that Hunt would reveal the 
burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.146  All of the overt acts of the 
conspiracy charged in the indictment occurred during the period of what I 
have labeled the “Cover-Up Conspiracy.”147  The majority of the overt acts 
concerned the payment of hush money to the burglars during this 
timeframe.148  As discussed above, the evidence presented at the trial 
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covered events outside the time frame of the conspiracy charged in the 
indictment.149 
The government’s position was that its case at the Watergate 
conspiracy trial established a single extensive conspiracy  
to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation into the 1972 burglaries and 
bugging of the DNC headquarters in the Watergate building and related matters.  
This conspiracy began within hours after the arrest of the burglars on June 17, 
1972.  The conspiracy was prompted by two considerations: that the Watergate 
break-in had been approved by CRP officials and members of White House staff, 
and that two leaders of the Watergate burglary, Hunt and Liddy, had previously 
engaged in other unlawful activities for the White House, including the 1971 
Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary.  The conspirator’s motivation was their desire to 
protect the Nixon administration.150 
The government’s position was also that “from its inception, the 
conspiracy necessarily included an agreement to conceal its existence and 
membership.”151 
III.  WAS WATERGATE A SINGLE CONSPIRACY OR  
MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES? 
As the previous discussion has outlined, the evidence at the Watergate 
trial could be viewed as proving four separate conspiracies, not the single 
conspiracy charged in the indictment.  On the other hand, perhaps the 
evidence is better described as a single conspiracy.  Earlier in this article, 
various approaches to the multiple conspiracy issue were discussed.152  
This section will discuss these different approaches to the evidence 
presented at the Watergate conspiracy trial. 
It would appear that the evidence at the Watergate conspiracy trial did 
not demonstrate multiple conspiracies under the hub and spoke approach.  
Watergate did not emanate from one hub; no one person was at the center 
of the scandal.  Various persons took leadership roles at different times.  
Although certain persons were more central to the conspiracy—for 
example, John Dean—and others clearly played only a minor role—for 
example, Fred LaRue—the minor figures cannot be viewed as mere spokes.  
Moreover, in a hub and spoke conspiracy, each of the conspiratorial spokes 
is usually acting independently of the others and is usually unaware of what 
other conspirators are doing.153  Although in the Watergate conspiracy, 
each defendant was not aware of every move made by the other 
conspirators, there was awareness that the others were involved in similar 
 
 149 The first acts listed in the indictment occur in 1972; the evidence presented at the trial covered 
events beginning in 1971. See The Plumbers, supra note 65. 
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conduct aimed at hiding the roles played by CRP and White House 
personnel in the DNC break-in.154 
Compared to the hub and spoke conspiracy, the evidence presented at 
the Watergate trial fits better into the single conspiracy chain conspiracy.  
Watergate could be viewed as four conspiracies linked together.  Even 
though there may have been no direct communication or contact among all 
of the conspirators, each played an important role in a conspiratorial 
scheme to obtain intelligence on political enemies, and to conceal that 
persons working for the Nixon White House and Nixon  
re-election campaign were involved in these illegal intelligence gathering 
acts. 
The problem with the chain conspiracy analysis is that this chain 
conspiracy was not the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The 
conspiracy of which defendants Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and 
Mardian were charged clearly did not cover the Ellsberg psychiatrist office 
burglary or the DNC Watergate burglary.155  The first overt act of the 
conspiracy charged in the indictment was just after the arrest of the 
Watergate burglars on June 17, 1972.156  Moreover, the prosecution 
introduced evidence of the Ellsberg psychiatrist and DNC burglaries only 
to establish motive for the conspiracy actually charged in the indictment.157  
More problematic is the evidence relating to events after Dean and others 
began cooperating with the prosecution.  These events, especially the 
words of Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman caught on tape, were not 
aimed at hiding the identities of those responsible for the earlier burglaries, 
but rather to get others to take the blame for those burglaries, and thus 
protect the three men within the inner circle of the White House.158  
Therefore, although the Watergate conspiracy is better viewed as a chain 
conspiracy compared to a hub and spoke conspiracy, the chain conspiracy 
approach is not an accurate description of the conspiracy charged in the 
indictment. 
 
 154 See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 55, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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Ellsberg break-in on the grounds that the prejudice engendered by the admission into evidence of such 
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Haldeman br. at 4. Rejecting this objection, the court admitted the evidence as being probative of 
motive.”). 
 158 See id. at  58   (“Nixon,  Dean,  Mitchell,  Haldeman,  and  Ehrlichman  then   took  up  a  discussion 
that had begun the day before: the best strategy for dealing with the upcoming Senate hearings.  Despite 
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blame and go to jail to save the Nixon presidency.  Lacking that alternative, they all focused on a plan 
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months.  Dean would make a report to the President.  It would be quite general and would indicate that 
no  one  from  the  White  House  was  involved.”). 
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If we focus on the agreement among the conspirators to determine 
whether the Watergate conspiracy was a single conspiracy or multiple 
conspiracies, the multiple conspiracy conclusion appears more accurate.  
There were clearly four separate agreements: (1) an agreement to gather 
information on Ellsberg by illegally obtaining his mental health records in 
order to discredit him and hopefully discredit the Pentagon Papers; (2) an 
agreement to gather information about Democratic Party officials and 
candidates by illegally obtaining information in order to gain some political 
advantage (although the exact reason for the Watergate burglary is still 
subject to debate); (3) an agreement to conceal that persons who worked at 
CRP and the White House had authorized the break-in; and (4) an 
agreement to blame persons already identified to the prosecution by Dean 
as solely responsible for the Watergate burglary and subsequent cover-up, 
and to absolve Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman.  It appears that none of 
the four defendants convicted at the Watergate conspiracy trial, except for 
perhaps Haldeman, were participants in all four agreements.  The evidence 
seems to support that Mitchell was not part of any agreement to burglarize 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist office, and not part of any agreement for him to take 
the blame for the Watergate burglary.159  Ehrlichman was not part of any 
agreement to burglarize the DNC offices.160  Most significantly, Robert 
Mardian was clearly not a party to any agreement involving Ellsberg, the 
actual Watergate break-in, or an agreement to protect White House 
personnel and to place blame on those outside the White House, including 
himself.161  Application of the “agreement” approach to multiple 
conspiracies seems to provide the strongest support for the conclusion that 
the evidence at the Watergate trial established multiple conspiracies 
contrary to the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. 
Whether the “common goal or purpose” approach leads to a multiple 
conspiracy conclusion depends on how broadly we define the goal and 
purpose of the conspirators.  On the one hand, the purpose of all the 
criminal conduct introduced at the Watergate trial could be viewed as 
supporting and protecting the presidency of Richard Nixon.  The 
conspirator’s goal was to help Nixon exercise power, be re-elected, and 
avoid impeachment.  Although the precise goals may have shifted during 
the full conspiratorial period, and not every conspirator was involved in all 
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phases of the conspiracy, it could be argued that there was a common goal 
of all the conspirators, and thus a single conspiracy.  On the other hand, this 
goal may be too broad.  All of the overt acts set forth in the indictment 
concerned only the goal of preventing disclosure that CRP and White 
House personnel had planned and organized the DNC burglary.  This goal 
was thoroughly defeated in April 1973 when Dean and others began 
cooperating with the prosecution.162  The goal of the next conspiracy, as 
stated by chief special prosecutor James Neal, was to “put it all on Mr. 
Mitchell, Mr. Magruder, and it also ropes in Mardian, LaRue, attorneys 
O’Brien, Parkinson and so forth . . . .  In other words, everybody except 
that tight circle now within the wagons.”163  Additionally, the goal of the 
Ellsberg psychiatrist burglary was limited to discrediting Ellsberg, not 
gathering information for Nixon’s re-election campaign. The common goal 
or purpose approach to conspiracies, like the agreement approach, seems to 
lend more support to the view that the evidence at the Watergate trial 
proved multiple conspiracies, although a broad application of the common 
goal or purpose approach could lead to a single conspiracy conclusion. 
IV.  PREJUDICE 
The possible conclusion that the evidence at the Watergate trial 
proved multiple conspiracies as opposed to the single conspiracy charged 
in the indictment does not mean that any defendant’s conviction should 
have been reversed.  The case law is very clear that proof of multiple 
conspiracies is harmless error unless prejudice can be proven.164  
Substantial prejudice from multiple conspiracies can be proven in several 
ways.  For example, if proof at trial differed so greatly from the indictment, 
prejudice can be based on unfair surprise and inability to prepare an 
adequate defense.165  A more typical prejudice claim is based on spillover.  
Evidence of multiple conspiracies can confuse jurors who may transfer 
proof of one of the conspiracies to a defendant involved in a different 
conspiracy.166  Although some courts have stated that the risk of spillover 
prejudice is less likely the fewer the defendants,167 courts have found 
prejudicial spillover even when there were only three defendants.168  
Another factor in evaluating spillover prejudice is the disparity in evidence 
against different defendants.  The greater the disparity, the more likely 
spillover is prejudicial.169 
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Additionally, courts have emphasized that prejudice exists if the jury 
transfers guilt from one defendant to another.170  Although courts have 
recognized that proper jury instructions can diminish the likelihood of 
prejudice, there are cases where the prejudicial spillover was so 
overwhelming, limiting instructions were not adequate to eliminate 
prejudice.171  Perhaps the most significant prejudice argument involves the 
improper admission of hearsay statements under the co-conspirator 
exception.  If all defendants are co-conspirators in a single conspiracy, the 
hearsay statements of any one defendant are admissible against every other 
defendant.172  In a multiple conspiracy situation, the statements of members 
of one conspiracy would not be properly admitted against defendants who 
were members of a separate conspiracy.173  On the other hand, even if the 
trial evidence established multiple conspiracies when the indictment 
alleged a single conspiracy, no prejudice exists if a defendant participated 
in the separate conspiracies.174  Moreover, proof of multiple conspiracies is 
not prejudicial when the evidence of conspiracies not charged in the 
indictment pertains to a chain of events explaining the context, motive, or 
set-up of the conspiracy charged.175  It is not prejudicial to admit evidence 
of other conspiracies linked in time and circumstances to the charged 
conspiracy.176  Nor is it prejudicial to present to the jury evidence of other 
conspiracies that are an “integral and a natural part” of the charged 
conspiracy, or necessary to “complete the story” of the charged 
conspiracy.177 
It would seem that the only defendant convicted at the Watergate 
conspiracy trial who might have been prejudiced by the proof of multiple 
conspiracies was Robert Mardian.  It is very doubtful that there was 
substantial prejudice to Mitchell, Haldeman, or Ehrlichman. 
First, Mardian was the only convicted defendant who was not a 
member of more than one of the multiple conspiracies.  As discussed 
earlier in this article, Ehrlichman was a member of the Ellsberg 
Conspiracy, the Cover-Up Conspiracy, and the White House Conspiracy.178  
Mitchell was a member of the Break-In Conspiracy and the Cover-Up 
Conspiracy.  Haldeman, at the least, was a member of the Cover-Up 
Conspiracy and White House Conspiracy, and possibly the Ellsberg 
Conspiracy and Break-In Conspiracy.  Therefore, the evidence pertaining 
to the Ellsberg Conspiracy and Break-In Conspiracy could easily be viewed 
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as providing the motive, context, and background for the participation of 
Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell in the Cover-Up Conspiracy charged 
in the indictment.  Mardian, however, was not part of any conspiracy other 
than the Cover-Up Conspiracy. 
Secondly, there was a large disparity in the evidence against Mardian 
compared to the other three convicted defendants.  In over 1600 pages of 
transcript of the direct and redirect testimony of government witnesses 
(excluding discussions with the court or between counsel), and 670 pages 
of White House tapes transcript, Mardian’s name appeared on 106 pages, 
less than five percent of the transcript pages.179  The evidence against 
Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell was overwhelming and greatly 
exceeded the evidence against Mardian.  This disparity in evidence lends 
support that Mardian was prejudiced by the evidence of multiple 
conspiracies. 
Most significant to Mardian’s prejudice argument is the introduction 
of the White House tapes into evidence at the Watergate Conspiracy trial.  
These tapes were admitted under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay.180  
If, however, the taped statements were made as part of a conspiracy 
different than the one with which Mardian was a member, these taped 
statements would be inadmissible against Mardian.  This would also be 
viewed as establishing prejudice from the proof of multiple conspiracies. 
The White House tapes played for the jury at the Watergate 
conspiracy trial included five references to Mardian.181  All five references 
occurred during conversations on April 14 and 15, 1973, in which 
Ehrlichman was reporting to Nixon what he had learned about Watergate 
during his interviews with several persons during the previous ten days.182  
This was the time period of the “White House Conspiracy” during which 
Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman were conspiring to place all the blame 
on Dean and CRP officials such as Mitchell, Magruder, Mardian, and 
LaRue—everybody except that “tight circle now within the wagons.”183  
These tapes of White House conversations were admitted against Mardian 
based on the prosecution’s position that statements among Ehrlichman, 
Nixon, and Haldeman were in furtherance of the single conspiracy in the 
indictment of which all four defendants were charged.184  To the extent that 
the White House Conspiracy, however, was a different conspiracy than the 
one alleged in the indictment, statements as part of and in furtherance of 
the White House Conspiracy would not be part of or in furtherance of the 
conspiracy of which Mardian was charged. 
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The prejudice to Mardian by the statements on the White House tapes 
is clear.  In a conversation on April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman told Nixon and 
Haldeman that he had a “bit of incidental intelligence” that Mardian had 
developed an “elaborate cover story which he fed to The New York Times, 
which lay it all back in the White House.”185  In a conversation later that 
same day, Ehrlichman told Nixon that he had heard that the “U.S. Attorney 
is hot after” Colson, Mitchell, Mardian, and Magruder.186  In another April 
14, 1973 conversation, Ehrlichman, in discussing Dean’s involvement, told 
Nixon and Haldeman that “Mardian and LaRue would say to Mitchell, 
‘Mitch, you’ve got to do something about this,’ and Mitchell’s stock 
answer was to turn to John Dean.”187  On April 15, 1973, Ehrlichman told 
Nixon that “there was a cover story which Mardian and others cooked 
up.”188  Another White House tape had Nixon telling Ehrlichman that 
Mardian, LaRue, Kalmbach, and Dean “gotta have a straight damn line 
that, of course we raised money.  Be very honest about it.  But, uh, we 
raised money for a purpose we thought was perfectly proper.”189 
Mardian had never spoken with Nixon, Haldeman, or Ehrlichman 
about any Watergate-related matter.190  These taped conversations were 
made after McCord had sent his letter to Judge Sirica, after Dean and 
others had begun cooperating with the prosecution, and nine months after 
Mardian had ceased being involved in any Watergate-related activities.  
These White House taped conversations therefore could properly be viewed 
as not during the course of or in furtherance of the Watergate Cover-up 
Conspiracy alleged in the indictment of which Mardian was charged.  
Mardian therefore would seem to have been prejudiced by the evidence of 
multiple conspiracies. 
CONCLUSION 
On appeal of his Watergate conspiracy conviction, Mardian raised 
several issues, including arguments dealing with multiple conspiracies and 
with the White House tapes.191  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia sitting en banc unanimously reversed Mardian’s conviction 
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based on severance.192  The court’s opinion was most influenced by the fact 
that two weeks after the trial had started, Mardian’s lead counsel, David 
Bress, had become very ill and was forced to leave the trial.193  A motion 
for severance was filed, but denied by Judge Sirica.194  The Court of 
Appeals held that “Mardian’s interest in being represented by counsel of 
his own choice, combined with the disproportion of the evidence to his 
potential prejudice, necessitated severance.  On this ground, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial.”195  The Court did not directly address the 
admissibility of the White House Tapes.196  It did note, 
Moreover, tape recordings of conversations between conspirators played an 
undeniably important role in the prosecution’s case.  Twenty-four of the 30 tapes 
the prosecution played presented conversations that occurred during March and 
April of 1973, further underscoring the significance of that time period.  Mardian 
was not a participant in any of the 30 taped conversations.  His name was 
mentioned five times on the tapes played to the jury.  He challenged in timely 
fashion each of the references as inadmissible and moved to have them deleted, 
supporting his motion with a lengthy memorandum of points and authorities.  
The court did delete a few references, but the five challenged here remained.197  
The court continued in a footnote: 
In light of our disposition of the case, we need not determine the admissibility of 
these references since the question, if it arises on retrial, will appear in a vastly 
different setting.  Even if some references are technically admissible under 
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court is still called upon to exclude 
evidence “‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.’” Rule 403, Fed. 
R. Evid.  When Mardian is retried singly, the major focus will be on the period of 
June and July of 1972.  Without the need to introduce evidence against other 
defendants, the balance between relevance and prejudice of statements made in 
March and April of 1973 may be substantially altered.198 
The court’s opinion did not address the multiple conspiracy 
argument.199  A few months after Mardian’s conviction was reversed, a 
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